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ABSTRACT 
This study observed the influence of the company prospector-defender strategy and 
auditor industry specialization toward the earnings management through real activities 
and earnings quality. An important finding in this study confirmed that the auditor industry 
specialization could not restrict the earnings management and the company‘s prospector 
strategy could restrict the earnings management. On the contrary, defender strategy could 
not restrict the earnings management. Another finding proved that the auditor industry 
specialization influence the earnings response coefficient (ERC) and investors’ response. 
Besides the auditor industry specialization, as well as the prospector and defender strate-
gies, other factors also affected influence ERC are leverage, company size, stock return, 
beta and market return. The interaction among the prospector and defender strategies and 
unexpected earnings neither influence the CAR nor the investors’ response. This was 
probably because the investors pay attention to the strategy used by the company. How-
ever, there were any interaction variables: industry specialization auditor, leverage, stock 
return, beta and market return influence the CAR and investors’ response. 
Keywords: auditor industry specialization, prospector-defender strategy, earnings 
response coefficient, earnings quality. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Research about factors affecting earnings 
quality is very important to do since earnings 
quality mechanism can bound managers’ abil-
ity to alter their accounting data. In the real 
world, accounting system provides a space for 
manager to influence the financial statement 
data. As a result, outcome on firm’s financial 
statement information are noisy and bias.  
Healy & Palepu (2004) pointed out that 
there are three sources of noise and bias in ac-
counting data: 1) The rigidity in the account-
ing rules; 2) The random forecast errors; and 
3) Systematic reporting choices made by cor-
porate managers in order to achieve specific 
objectives. First, the noisy accounting rule in 
SFAC No.2 issued by the FASB requires firms 
to Expend research outlays when they are in-
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curred. Obviously, some research expenditures 
have future value while others do not. Second, 
the source of noise arises from forecast error 
on credit trade prediction, where managers 
cannot predict future cost of current transac-
tions. Manager estimates account receivables 
that cannot be collected and this failure in 
customer’s payment resulted in an error pre-
diction. Third, manager’s accounting choice 
included accounting based on debt covenants, 
management compensation, tax consideration, 
rule consideration, stock exchange considera-
tion, shareholders consideration, as well as 
business competition consideration.  
Besides earnings quality factors, audit 
factor is also capable to increase earnings 
quality and to bind earnings management. 
Auditor who has a comprehensive under-
standing of industry characteristics is more 
effective in auditing compared to those with-
out knowledge of industry characteristics 
(Maletta & Wright, 1996); Becker (1998) 
stated that earnings management rate is higher 
for client with non Big Six auditor. Solomon 
et al. (1999) found that specialist auditor is 
more accurate in auditing and does not per-
form an error audit. Client of non specialist 
auditor reported a higher discretionary accrual 
than those reported by a client of specialist 
auditor (Krishnan, 2003), which by then sup-
ported Johnson et al. (1991), O’Keefe et al. 
(1994), Becker (1998) and Solomon (1999). 
Furthermore, researches on auditor spe-
cialization with earnings response coefficient 
(ERC) which are conducted by Teoh & Wong 
(1993) and Mayangsari (2003). Teoh & Wong 
(1993) reported that client with a big six 
auditor has a high ERC. In Indonesia, while 
Mayangsari (2003) found a proof that auditor 
specialization correlated positively with 
financial report integrity, and corporate gover-
nance correlated negatively with financial 
report. Furthermore, Mayangsari (2004) 
proved that auditor specialization influenced 
ERC.  
Earnings management can also be con-
ducted by firm which competes in an industry 
that finally influences the policy option of 
financial statement (Healy & Palepu, 2004). In 
a highly competitive business world, firm is 
challenged to conduct the right business strat-
egy. Therefore, firm is able to compete and go 
over its competitor in gaining earnings and 
chances to grow. There are four firm’s com-
petition typologies: prospector, defender, 
analyzer, and reactor (Miles & Snow, 1978; 
Habbe & Hartono, 2001); prospector, ana-
lyzer, low cost defender, and differential de-
fender (Olson, 2005).  
Miles & Snow (1978) and Olson et al. 
(2005) stated that prospector has competitive 
characteristics to offer product that differs 
with its competitor, where in other word it is 
unique (differentiation strategy). Defender has 
a competitive characteristic by offering a 
cheaper product (cost leadership strategy). 
Besides Miles & Snow (1978) and Habbe & 
Hartono (2001), a research on prospector and 
defender organizational strategy was done by 
Porter (1980); Anthony & Ramesh (1992), 
Woodside et al. (1999); Olson et al. (2005). 
The result of Habbe & Hartono (2001) and 
Saraswati & Atmini (2007) on association 
between stock price and prospector and 
defender firm are not significant.  
This research differs from the previous re-
searches. This research is associated with the 
possibility of prospector and defender’s audi-
tor specialization to limit earnings manage-
ment and also to get information on prospector 
and defender’s earnings quality. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Prospector and Defender Organizational 
Strategy and Earnings Management 
Competition strategy is conducted by a 
firm in order to survive and able to compete 
with other firms. Miles & Snow (1978) stated 
that competition strategy comprises of 
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prospector, defender, analyzer, and reaction. 
Olson (2005) pointed out that firm strategy 
consist of prospector, analyzer, low cost de-
fender, and differentiated defender. Prospector 
is always observing market opportunity and 
doing product innovation, while defender has 
a narrow product domain and does not inno-
vate on technology, structure, and operational 
method, but only increases operational effi-
ciency. Analyzer, operates in a stable market-
product domain, gives attention to competi-
tor’s new ideas. Reactors, does not response 
changes and environment instability, and con-
sistent with strategy and structure.  
Porter (1980) stated that firm in growth 
phase has a higher margin and profit than that 
in maturity phase. This is because the growing 
firm is still in its developing phase and also 
doing a lot of investment so thus its ROI is 
still low compared to a mature firm. In addi-
tion, Anthony & Ramesh (1992) also found 
that in growth phase, the growing of sales is 
higher than in maturity and decline phase. In 
this phase, the dividend payout is lower than 
that in maturity phase. It means that prospector 
firm gives a small small dividend to share-
holders. Subsequently, Ittner, et al. (1997) 
found that in a competition, a prospector firm 
gives more weight on product innovation as a 
competitive advantage. Therefore, a prospec-
tor firm tends to invest in form of R&D and 
has a bigger capital expenditure than a de-
fender firm. 
In Indonesia, Habbe & Hartono (2001) 
examined the association between stock price 
and accounting performance measurement for 
prospector and defender firm. Habbe & 
Hartono (2001) did not find any empirical 
evidence of relationship between stock price 
and prospector and defender strategy. Saras-
wati & Atmini (2007) examined market re-
action to prospector and defender accounting 
performance measurement after crisis period. 
The result proved that prospector firm has a 
higher growth rate of earnings and sales than 
defender firm (insignificant), dividend payout 
ratio of defender firm is higher than that of 
prospector firm, and last, market reaction of 
prospector is higher than defender’s (also in-
significant). 
Earnings management is a choice of ac-
counting policy for manager to achieve several 
particular objectives (Scott, 2006). Healy & 
Palepu (2004) said that there are three sources 
of noise and bias in accounting data which are 
noisy in accounting rule, error prediction, and 
manager’s accounting policy choice which 
includes business competition. Thus, earnings 
management can emerge from business com-
petition between firms. Next, Burgstahler & 
Emas (1998) in Aljifri (2007) stated that 
earnings management can be developed from 
actual operation, investment, and funding 
which can influence the size of accounting 
earnings. This is in accordance with Roy-
chowdurry (2006) who argued that earnings 
management through real activity is indicated 
with low abnormal discretionary cost and high 
abnormal production cost.  
Discretionary cost expenditure includes 
research and development (R&D), as well as 
advertising, maintenance, sales, general and 
administration costs. Firm reduces reported 
cost and increases the sales by selecting dis-
cretionary cost expenditure to increase earn-
ings. Manager selects discretionary cost to 
achieve earnings target, showing that discre-
tionary cost is low.  
Manufacture firm’s manager can produce 
more goods than actual demand to increase 
earnings. With higher production rate, over-
head cost is still distributed to several bigger 
units, so that fixed cost per unit is lower. As 
long as reduced cost is still done per unit, there 
will be no increasing in marginal cost per unit, 
hence fixed cost per unit becomes lower. This 
implicates that cost of goods sold is reported 
lower and firm reports a better operational 
margin. Firm does not close production cost 
and saving cost of all items that are produced 
in the same sales period. As a result, opera-
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tional cash flow is lower than given normal 
sales rate. 
Audit Industry Specialization 
Agency theory and contracting theory are 
developed to explain audit brand name and 
industry specialization as a function to reduce 
agency cost (Craswell, et al., 1995). Audit 
quality can reduce agency problem that occurs 
between management as the agent and stock-
holder as the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Audit quality also can reduce 
contracting problem and reduce monitoring 
cost (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Hogan & 
Jeter (1996) stated that auditor who has 
industry specialization gives a better audit 
quality than a non-specialist one. According to 
Hogan & Jeter (1996), auditor specialization is 
required and increasing due to the expanding 
target market and competition between 
accounting firms. Auditor concentration in-
creases in an unregulated industry with a low 
claim. 
Auditor reputation is related with how the 
auditor can create useful information for fi-
nancial users. Jensen & Meckling (1976) and 
Watts & Zimmerman (1986) stated that 
auditor with a good reputation can solve debt 
contract problem by giving valuable informa-
tion about debtor. On the contrary, a limitation 
on information availability concerning the 
firm will make lender (creditor) depends on 
firm’s disclosure. This disclosure will be util-
ized to evaluate the performance and future 
prospect. Later, if information availability is 
restricted, the lender will have to spend an 
expensive cost to get information and to 
monitor a reliable financial statement. Thus, 
information gap between stockholder (princi-
pal) and manager (agent) will influence 
agency cost. It can also influence monitoring 
cost. According to previous research, agency 
cost and monitoring cost are expected to de-
crease with the emergence of audit quality and 
auditor specialization in industry.  
Research on audit quality conducted by 
Dopuch & Simunic (1982) confirmed that 
special auditor invests more on recruitment 
and training, information technology, and au-
diting technology than that done by non spe-
cialist auditor. Johnson, et al. (1991) 
discovered evidence that industry expertise is 
related with the ability to detect fraud. 
O’Keefe, et al. (1994) also found evidence 
that specialist auditor shows obedience to 
audit standard (GAAS) compared those of non 
specialist one. While Teoh & Wong (1993) 
reported that client with Big 6 Auditor has a 
high Earnings Response Coefficient. These 
researches showed that audit quality can 
increase earnings quality and financial state-
ment quality.  
Research associating auditor specializa-
tion with earnings management is done by 
Maletta & Wright (1996) who examine fun-
damental difference in character and method 
in detecting earnings management. Maletta & 
Wright (1996) stated that auditor with a 
comprehensive understanding of industry 
characteristic audits more effectively than 
auditor without knowledge of industry char-
acteristics.  
Next, Beker (1998) showed that earnings 
management rate is higher for client with a 
non Big 6 Auditor. Thus, client of a Big 6 
Auditor reported discretionary accrual that in 
average is higher than that reported by client 
of Big 6 Auditor. Solomon (1999) conducted a 
research on industry specialist auditor and 
found evidence that specialist auditor is more 
accurate in detecting errors than non specialist 
auditor. Hogan & Jeter (1999) also found that 
auditor specialization indicates a qualified 
audit. This finding is important Accounting 
firms who rarely conduct audit will give an 
incorrect explanation about ration fluctuation. 
An effective audit depends on accuracy and 
auditor who has special expertise that related 
to audit effectiveness. Therefore, auditor with 
special expertise is able to assist in detecting 
earnings management.  
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To answer opinion that a qualified auditor 
can reduce monitoring cost, Francis, et al. 
(1999) conducted a research. The result also 
proved that external monitoring can restrict 
earnings opportunity to report financial state-
ment based on accrual. Next, Pittman & 
Forting (2004) pointed out that qualified 
auditor (the Big 6) can reduce debt monitoring 
cost by increasing financial statement credi-
bility. Auditor expertise is also able to reduce 
problem of asymmetric information between 
debtor and creditor.  
Audit quality is difficult to observe since 
it has a multidimensional size. This is in ac-
cordance with Balsam, et al. (2003) who 
stated that audit quality is multidimensional as 
well as difficult to observe and has no single 
characteristic of proxy. Balsam, et al. (2003) 
proved that client of the Big 6 specialist 
auditor has a lower discretionary accrual and a 
higher ERC than those of non Big 6 client. 
Research shows that a low audit quality 
correlates with flexibility on choosing 
accounting methods.  
Result of Johnson, et al. (1991), O’Keefe, 
et al. (1994), Becker (1998), Solomon (1999), 
and Balsam, et al. (2003) supported Khrisnan 
(2003); that research on expertise of the Big 6 
industry auditor can limit earnings mana-
gement. Khrisnan (2003) research result 
proved that client of a non specialist auditor 
reported absolute discretionary accrual above 
average rate of 1.2% from total assets, which 
is higher than discretionary accrual reported 
by client of a specialist auditor. That result is 
consistent with opinion which stated that 
specialist auditor can reduce earnings mana-
gement compare to non specialist auditor. 
Roychowdhury (2006) pointed out that 
discretionary cost such as research & de-
velopment (R&D), advertisement, and mainte-
nance are commonly charged upon its 
happening. Therefore, firm reduces discre-
tionary cost to raise earnings. Hence, a low 
discretionary cost indicates the emergence of 
earnings management. In general, previous 
researches proved that audit quality can reduce 
earnings management. Audit quality correlates 
with auditor specialization and auditor’s 
reputation, where three of them should be pos-
sessed by auditor since it is a component of 
auditor expertise. Several researches also sup-
ported the statement that specialist auditor has 
a good resource and a good experience, as 
well as has the ability to detect and to restrict 
earnings management.  
Mayangsari (2003) found evidence that 
auditor specialization has a positive impact on 
financial statement integrity while corporate 
governance negatively correlates with finan-
cial statement. Later, Mayangsari (2004) 
found that auditor industry specialization with 
earnings response coefficient/ERC. Unlike 
Mayangsari (2003, 2004), Siregar & Utama 
(2006) and Andayani, et al. (2008) found 
evidence that the Big 4 auditor is not able to 
restrict earnings management. This result 
emerged due to the inappropriateness of audit 
quality proxy which used accounting firms 
measure. Hence, this research uses audit 
quality proxy of industry specialization. 
Therefore, the hypotheses are as follows: 
H1a: abnormal discretionary cost of firm 
using auditor industry specialization is 
higher than that of firm without auditor 
industry specialization. 
H1b: abnormal discretionary cost of firm 
using prospector strategy is higher than 
that of firm using defender strategy. 
H1c: firm using auditor industry speciali-
zation will be positively responded by 
investor than that of firm without auditor 
industry specialization. 
H1d: firm using prospector strategy will posi-
tively responded by investor than that of 
firm using defender strategy. 
Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) 
ERC is a measure of unexpected earnings’ 
effect on stock return, and is measured as a 
regression slope of abnormal stock return and 
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unexpected earnings (Cho & Jung, 1991). 
ERC is also used as a measure of earnings 
quality (Choi & Jeter, 1990). Teoh & Wong 
(1993) examined the effect of auditor quality 
on earnings response coefficient and found 
that investor responded to unexpected 
earnings, consistent with that of Balsam, et al. 
(2003). Balsam, et al. (2003) examined the 
connection between earnings quality (meas-
ured with ERC) and industry specialist audi-
tor, and found that specialist auditor gives 
more reliable earnings signal and having a 
higher ERC than that of a non specialist audi-
tor. Therefore, the hypothesis can be con-
cluded as follows: 
H2: the earnings quality of firm using an 
industry specialization and using pros-
pector strategy is higher than that of firm 
which is not using industry specialization 
and using defender strategy.  
RESEARCH METHODS 
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
Population in this research is all firms 
listed in Bursa Efek Indonesia (formerly Bursa 
Efek Jakarta). The sample selection is based 
on purposive sampling method in order to gain 
representative sample according to criteria as 
follows: 
Samples are firms listed on BEI in 2004-
2006 and are not regulated (Dunn, et al., 
2004). This period is chosen under the 
assumption that monetary crisis’ effect is 
getting smaller. Unregulated firms are chosen 
because they are not affected by tariff rule, 
such as one set by government for oil and 
transportation industry, and also financial 
industry get government’s rule on interest rate.  
Regression Test Equation of Research 
Hypotheses 
Yit = α0 + β1(SP) it + β2(PD) it +β3(CFO)it + 
β4(LEV)it + β5 (LTA)it + εit (1) 
where: 
Yt  =  abnormal discretionary cost. Abnormal 
discretionary cost is an estimates of 
residual (Khrisnan, 2003 and Balsam, 
et al., 2003) which is then being abso-
luted (Balsam, 2003).  
SP  =  1 is auditor who has industry specia-
lization by The Big 4. The Big 4 con-
sists of PWC (partner Haryanto Sahari 
& Co); Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
(partner Hans, Tuanakotta Mustofa & 
Halim); KPMG (Siddharta & 
Harsono); Ernst & Young (partner 
Prasetyo, Sarwoko, & Sandjaya) and 0 
is vice versa 
PD  =  1 if firm is a prospector type and 0 if 
firm is a defender type 
TA =  Assets’s Total Logarithm as a proxy of 
firm’s size, as a control variable based 
on previous research (Balsam, et al., 
2003; Reynolds & Francis, 2000; 
Becker, et al., 1998; Warfield, et al., 
1995). 
CFO = operational cash flow, as a control 
variable based on previous research 
(Balsam, et al., 2003; Reynolds & 
Francis, 2000; Becker, et al., 1998; 
Warfield, et al., 1995). 
LEV =  long-term debt ratio, scaled using total 
assets, as a control variable based on 
previous research (Balsam, et al., 
2003; Reynolds & Francis, 2000; 
Becker, et al., 1998; Warfield, et al., 
1995). 
Earnings Management Proxy through Real 
Activity 
1. DISKRESt/At-1 = α0 + α1 (1/At-1) +  
β1(Penjt/At-1) + εt (2) 
DISKRES =  sales and general admini-
stration cost 
2. Yt= α0 + α1SPit + α2PDit + α3LTAit + 
α4CFOit + α5LEVit + εit. (3) 
In this case: 
Yt is an abnormal discretionary cost 
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SP = audit specialization, 1, if it is audited by 
a specialist auditor and 0 if it is audited 
by a non specialist; PD = Prospector and 
defender type of firm; LTA = total asset; 
CFO = operating cash flow; LEV = lev-
erage. 
Proxy of Prospector and Defender Firm 
Proxy for prospector and defender firm is: 
1. The sum of employee divided by total 
sales (KAR/PEN) 
2. Price to book value (PBV) (Ittner et 
al 1997). 
3. Capital expenditure divided by mar-
ket value of equity (CEMVE) 
4. Capital expenditure divided by total 
asset (CETA) (Skinner 1993, 
Kallapur and Trombley 1999). 
5. KARPEN = KAR/PENJ  (4)  
6. PBV = MV/BV  (5)  
7. CETA = (CE
t 
– Ce
t-1
)/TA
t-1 
 (6)  
8. CEMVE = (CE
t 
– Ce
t-1
)/MVE
t-1 
 (7)  
In this case: 
KAR = total employee; PEN = total nett 
sales; MV = market price per share; BV = 
book value per share; CE t = capital ex-
penditure year t; CE t-1 = capital expendi-
ture year t-1; MV t-1 = market value of eq-
uity in the end of year t-1; TA t-1 = total 
asset year t-1 
The value of those four variables is then ana-
lyzed with common factor analysis. 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is a 
proxy of stock price which shows the size of 
market respond to published accounting earn-
ings. Abnormal return shows market response 
towards an event while abnormal return is a 
difference between actual return and normal 
return (Hartono, 2000). Normal return is in-
vestor’s expected return. Assumption used in 
this study is the semi efficient market assump-
tion and investor has an expected return. Ab-
normal return occurs because there is new 
information that alters investor’s expected 
return. Expected return is calculated by de-
ducting actual return with expected return as 
shown below: 
ARit =Rit – E (Rit) (8) 
In this case: 
AR it = abnormal return security i in pe-
riod t; R it = actual return security i in pe-
riod t; E (R it) = expected return security i 
in period t; Expected return is estimated 
with market model, using regression 
equation technique (CAPM formula) as 
follows: 
imtiiit RR    (9) 
In this case: 
R it = return security i in estimated period 
t; α it = intercept security i; β it = beta secu-
rity i; RM t = market index return at esti-
mated period t; CAR around event period 
is calculated by summing abnormal return 
for firm i along short term window period, 
this period is used since investor will 
quickly react to economic-value informa-
tion.  
it
t
i ARCAR 

 
5
5
)5,5(  (10) 
In this case: 
CAR it = Cumulative Abnormal Return 
firm i at observing period ±5 days since 
date of issue of the financial statements  
AR it = Abnormal Return firm i in day t. 
Unexpected Earnings (UE) 
Unexpected Earnings (UE) is a difference 
between the actual earnings and the expected 
earnings. The expected earnings are estimated 
by random walk model. Random walk model 
estimates that walking period earnings is 
similar with previous period earnings, like 
those used by Kallapur (1994). 
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1
1)(


it
tit
P
EPSEPS
itUE  (11) 
In this case: 
Ueit= Unexpected earnings firm i in pe-
riod t; EPSit= earnings per share firm i in 
period t; Pit-1=stock price firm i in period 
t 
Earnings Response Coefficient Test 
This research examines hypothesis that 
ERC using auditor industry specialization and 
having prospector type is higher than that of 
defender firm which is not audited by non-
auditor industry specialization by using re-
gression as follows:  
 PDSPUECAR ititit 3210   
            itMB4  LEVLTA 65   
          itit RETBETACFO 987   
         itit eRETPASAR 10   (12) 
 ititit UESPUECAR *210   
        itit UEMBUEPD ** 43   
        itit UELEVUELTA ** 65   
        itit UEBETAUECFO ** 87   
       itUERET *9  
       itit eUERETPASAR *10  (13) 
In this case: 
CARit = Cumulative Abnormal Return; 
UE= Unexpected earnings; MB= market 
to book ratio (market value ratio divided 
by book equity value (Balsam, 2003; 
Collins and Kothari, 1989); LTA= log to-
tal assets, as a controlling variable 
(Balsam, 2003; Bowen et al, 1992); 
LEV= leverage; CFO= operating cash 
flow; BETA= market model beta, which 
is a systematic risk expected to effect 
negatively on ERC (Balsam, 2003; 
Collins &  Kothari, 1989; Lipe, 1990). 
RET= return, to reduce the calculation er-
ror of UE. (Balsam, 2003; Easton & 
Zmijewski, 1989) 
ERC= coefficient slope, which is put into 
regression as an interaction with UE vari-
able. ERC of specialist auditor is greater 
than that of non specialist auditor. 
Market return= is used for minimizing UE 
error measure. 
FINDINGS AND CONSEQUENCES 
Selection on prospector and defender firm 
and on auditor industry specialization  
The selection of firm with prospector and 
defender typology is using factor analysis. 
This procedure is utilized to identify latent 
dimension or to shape data representing the 
original variable (Hair, et al, 1995). Those 
four variables are CEMVE, PBV, KARPEN, 
CETA. Fac_sum is a sum variable of factor 1 
and factor 2 score which is an index to classify 
firm with prospector and defender typology. 
The sum of these indexes (fac sum) is then 
ranked, one-third highest rank represent pros-
pector typology while one-third lowest rank is 
a defender typology. From here, 243 prospec-
tor firms and 240 defender firms are obtained.
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Table 1. Common Factor Analysis 
A. Communalities of four indicator variable 
 Variabel CEMVE PBV KARPEN  CETA 
 Communalities 0.652 0.558 0.641 0.235 
B. Eigenvalues for correlation matrix deduction 
 Factor 1 2 3 4 
 Eigenvalues 1.059 1.027 0.987 0.927 
C. Correlation between factors with four indicators 
 Indicator CEMVE PBV KARPEN CETA 
 Factor 1 0.200 0.741 0.987 0.927 
 Factor 2 0.782 0.095 0.603 0.208 
 
Subsequently, common factor analysis pointed out 483 firms, where later identification shows 236 
firms using specialist auditor and 247 firms using non-specialist auditor.  
Abnormal Discretionary Cost as an Indication of Earnings Management 
Table 2. Regression Test Result 
Yit = α0 + β1(SP) it + β2(PD) it +β3(CFO)it + β4(LEV)it + β5 (LTA)it + εit 
where: Yit is abnormal discretionary cost. 
Variable Coefficient t p-value 
SP -0.034765 -9.125575 0.0000*** 
LTA -0.136906 -53.71166 0.0000*** 
LEV -0.008329 -2.669186 0.0076*** 
CFO 6.35E-08 1402.343 0.0000*** 
PD 0.016708 4.656048 0.0000*** 
R2 = 0.894092 
Adj R2 = 0.894090 
F = 393883.0 (0.0000)*** 
DW = 2.023800; 483 firm-year sample; Heteroscedasticity test using Breusch Pagan Godfrey 
and showing insignificant probability at α > 0.05 and showing no multicolinearity. 
*significant at p<0.1, ** significant at p<0.05, *** significant at p<0.01 
 
H1a test result showed that firm using 
auditor industry specialization correlates 
negatively with earnings management, signifi-
cant at α=0.0000, which means firm with 
auditor industry specialization cannot restrict 
earnings management. This result showed that 
firm audited by auditor industry specialization 
has a low discretionary. Roychowdury (2006) 
stated that to detect real activities manipula-
tion to avoid losses. He investigates patterns in 
CFO, discretionary expense and production 
cost. Discretionary expense is defined as the 
sum of a). advertising expenses, b). Research 
and Development expense and c). selling, gen-
eral and administrative (SG&A) expenses. 
Discretionary expense such as R&D, adver-
tising, and maintenance are generally ex-
pensed in the same period that they are in-
curred. Hence firms can reduce reported ex-
penses, and increase earnings, by reducing 
discretionary expenditures. Thus, this research 
shows that auditor industry specialization can-
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not restrict earnings management because the 
sign shows negative. This result supports 
Siregar & Utama (2006) and Andayani, et al. 
(2008). 
H1b test result showed that prospector 
type of firm correlates positively with earnings 
management significant statistically at α= 
0.0000, hence prospector firm has a high dis-
cretionary cost, while in the opposite defender 
firm has a low discretionary cost. Prospector 
firms always observe market opportunity and 
always innovation products. As a conse-
quence, they never conduct such industrial 
competition since it is already in a mature 
condition and has a tough target market. This 
is in accordance with Feltham & Ohlson 
(1996) which pointed out that firm growth 
concept causes a reported net assets that is 
lower than market value. Greenball in 
Penmann & Zang (2000) also stated that 
conservative interaction with growth, so that 
accounting rates of return is lower than that 
without growth. Skinner & Sloan (2002) 
documented that firms with growth opportuni-
ties are penalized more by the stock market 
when they miss earnings thresholds. On the 
contrary, defender type of firm has a narrow 
product domains, hence firm should struggle 
hard to compete with competitor to increase 
earnings. Defender firm has a narrow product 
domain, and they do not conduct innovations 
on technoloty, structure, and operation method 
only increase operation efficiency. Therefore, 
defender firm has small earnings and never 
conduct earnings management. 
Test result also found that firm size cor-
related negatively with earnings management 
significant at α=0.0000, which means the 
smaller the size of the firm, the higher the dis-
cretionary cost, therefore shows no conducted 
earnings management. Leverage correlated 
negatively with earnings management with a 
significance at α=0.0000, where it showed that 
a high-leverage firm has a low discretionary 
cost and conducted earnings management. 
CFO correlated positively with earnings man-
agement significant at α=0.0000, which means 
that a high CFO shows no earnings manage-
ment. 
Earnings Response Coefficient 
Unexpected Earnings (UE) is calculated 
using Kallapur (1994) formula since Balsam 
(2003) showed insignificancy. Therefore, re-
input is done to calculate UE using Kallapur’s 
formula (1994). 
H1c test result is supported, firm using 
auditor industry specialization correlated 
positively with market reaction significantly at 
α=0.0000, which indicates a firm using auditor 
industry specialization will be responded by 
investor more positively than firm without 
auditor industry specialization. H1d test result 
is also supported, showing that prospector 
company correlated negatively with earnings 
management significantly at α=0.0000, thus 
prospector firm is positively responded by 
investor, which means that this type of 
company will likely get more attention from 
the investor to invest its capital. On the 
contrary, defender firm is less responded by 
the market, which indicates this type of firm 
always observes market opportunity and 
always innovate product therefore they never 
conduct such industrial competition since it is 
already in mature condition and has a tough 
target market. It also has a narrow product 
domain, thus firm struggles hard to compete 
with competitor to increase earnings. 
Balsam (2003) and Mayangsari (2004) 
examined auditor industry specialization 
towards earnings management measured with 
ERC which excludes prospector – defender 
strategy into research model. Our study 
includes prospector and defender strategy into 
research model where the result showed that 
prospector and defender strategy is responded 
by the market. This test result does not support 
that of Saraswati & Atmini (2007), Habbe & 
Hartono (2001), who conducted different 
dividend test and prospector-defender firm 
strategy towards market reaction. 
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Table 3. Overall UE Regression Test Result 
 PDSPUECAR ititit 3210  itMB4
 BETACFOLEVLTA it 8765  itRET9 itit eRETPASAR 10  
Variable Coefficient t p-value 
UE -0.002033 -41.27092 0.0000*** 
SP 0.034945 17.56583 0.0000*** 
PD -0.044236 -22.21217 0.0000*** 
MB 8.71E-05 4.806047 0.0000*** 
LTA 9.72-10 9.471217 0.0000*** 
CFO 1.32E-10 5.255731 0.0000*** 
LEV 0.0239221 13.88479 0.0000*** 
RET 0.749221 140.5329 0.0000*** 
BETA 0.019293 21.06574 0.0000*** 
RETPASAR 0.023830 4.573869 0.0000*** 
R2 = 0.090191 
Adj R2 = 0.09152 
F = 2312.521 (0.0000)*** 
DW=2.335; 483 firm-year samle; Heteroscedasticity test using Breusch Pagan Godfrey and 
showing insignificant probability at α > 0.05; normality test using Jarque Bera, residual has a 
normal distribution significant at α = 0.315700 
* significant at p<0.1, ** significant at p<0.05, *** significant at p<0.01 
 
Table 4. Overall UE Regression Test Result 
 itititit UEPDUESPUECAR ** 3210  itUEMB *4
 itititit UEBETAUECFOUELEVUELTA **** 8765  itUERET *9
itit eUERETPASAR *10  
Variable Coefficient t p-value 
UE -0.002864 -3.589908 0.0003*** 
SP*UE 0.001740 3.010981 0.0026*** 
PD*UE 0.003657 4.501863 0.0000*** 
MB*UE -0.000163 -11.85321 0.0780* 
LTA*UE -5.28E-10 -3.837695 0.0000*** 
CFO*UE 1.80E-09 16.22082 0.0000*** 
LEV*UE -0.002282 -3.837695 0.0001*** 
RET*UE 0.002079 4.408075 0.0000*** 
BETA*UE -0.001614 -5.636587 0.0000*** 
RETPASAR*UE 0.005645 3.465993 0.0005*** 
R2 = 0.001667 
Adj R2 = 0.001625 
F = 38.96379 (0.0000)*** 
DW=1.980034; sample=483 firm - year; Heteroscedasticity test using Breusch Pagan Godfrey 
and showing insignificant probability at α > 0.05; Normality test using Jarque Bera, residual 
has a normal distribution 
* significant at p<0.1, ** significant at p<0.05, *** significant at p<0.01 
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Based on table 4, we can conclude that 
hypothesis 2 in this research is supported. This 
research indicates that ERC’s size is affected 
by auditor characteristics and firm’s strategy. 
Auditor industry specialization and prospector 
strategy will result on a higher ERC than that 
of non auditor industry specialization and 
defender firm. It means that reported earnings 
quality is influenced by auditor industry 
specialization and firm’s strategy. Leverage 
showed negative, hence supported Dhaliwal, 
et al. (1991). This condition occurs because 
leverage decline year is relatively high, which 
by the led to a small earnings quality and 
negative market response. Beta or risk is also 
negative, which indicates that a small risk 
leads to qualified earnings. Firm’s size and 
growth are also negative, which explain that 
big-sized firm and growing firm have low 
quality earnings and are responded negatively 
by the market. 
In a case of positive UE, UE correlated 
negatively with CAR with significance of 
α=0.0000. It means that when UE is small, 
investor will respond and will not invest its 
earnings on a firm with small earnings coeffi-
cient. Auditor industry specialization corre-
lated negatively at α=0.0000, where firm that 
is not audited by the Big 4 will be responded 
by investor and investor will not invest its 
fund in that firm. Prospector-defender corre-
lated positively at α=0.0000, which means that 
prospector firm will be responded positively 
by investor and it will invest in that firm. Lev-
erage correlated negatively with earnings coef-
ficient and is responded by investor, which is 
significant at α=0.0000. This finding sup-
ported Dhaliwal, et al. (1991) that showed lev-
erage correlated negatively. Negatively corre-
lated leverage indicates that a constantly big 
leverage from year to year will lead to small 
earnings. Beta correlated negatively with CAR 
and significant at α=0.0000, which means that 
small risk will be responded by investor and 
they will invest on that firm. Return and mar-
ket return also correlated positively with CAR 
and are responded by investor at α=0.0000, 
which means big return and market return will 
be responded by investor and will gain more 
attention from investor. 
 
Table 5. Positive UE Regression Test Result 
 PDSPUECAR ititit 3210  itMB4
 BETACFOLEVLTA it 8765  itRET9 itit eRETPASAR 10  
Variable Coefficient t p-value 
UE -0.004406 -145.8332 0.0000*** 
SP -0.013294 -14.08625 0.0000*** 
PD 0.011639 13.13362 0.0000*** 
MB 2.82E-05 4.098196 0.0000*** 
LTA 0.016975 27.40366 0.0000*** 
CFO 1.29E-10 14.18906 0.0000*** 
LEV -0.000334 -0.461655 0.6443 
RET 0.750338 302.1290 0.0000*** 
BETA -0.009358 -22.63805 0.0000*** 
RETPSR 0.069222 30.58636 0.0000*** 
R2 = 0.486571 
Adj R2 = 0.486521 
F = 9614.201 (0.0000)*** 
DW = 2.3353; sample 319 firm-year; Heteroscedasticity test using Breusch Pagan Godfrey 
and showing insignificant probability at α > 0.05; Normality test using Jarque Bera, resid-
ual has a normal distribution.  
* significant at p<0.1, ** significant at p<0.05, *** significant at p<0.01 
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Table 6. Positive UE Regression Test Result 
 itititit UEPDUESPUECAR ** 3210  itUEMB *4
 itititit UEBETAUECFOUELEVUELTA **** 8765  itUERET *9
itit eUERETPASAR *10  
Variable Coefficient t p-value 
UE 0.019371 8.140759 0.0000*** 
SP*UE 0.002385 3.325885 0.0000*** 
PD*UE 0.003968 6.567321 0.0000*** 
MB*UE 0.000231 4.315687 0.0000*** 
LTA*UE -0.003247 -7.07143 0.0000*** 
CFO*UE 1.29E-10 22.31036 0.0000*** 
LEV*UE -0.002818 -5.685951 0.0000*** 
RET*UE -0.000838 -1.892223 0.0585* 
BETA*UE -0.009342 -27.83631 0.0000*** 
RETPSR*UE -0.022719 -11.69303 0.0000*** 
R2 = 0.017331 
Adj R2 = 0.017234 
F = 179.4481 (0.0000)*** 
DW = 2.065399; sample= 319 firm-year; Heteroscedasticity test using Breusch Pagan 
Godfrey and showing insignificant at α > 0.05; Normality test using Jarque Bera, residual 
has a normal distribution.  
* significant at p<0.1, ** significant at p<0.05, *** significant at p<0.01 
 
Table 7. Negative UE Regression Test Result 
 itititit PDSPUECAR 3210  itMB4
 itititit BETACFOLEVLTA 8765  itRET9 itit eRETPASAR 10  
Variable Coefficient t p-value 
UE -5.89E-05 -2.437860 0.0148** 
SP -0.014549 -10.39449 0.0000*** 
PD -0.027959 -20.19750 0.0000*** 
MB 7.61E-05 2.46E-05 0.0020** 
LTA -0.015369 -14.45648 0.0000*** 
LEV 0.014323 10.31422 0.0000*** 
CFO 5.86E-09 8.070869 0.0000*** 
RET 0.862314 229.5625 0.0000*** 
BETA 0.001452 2.421603 0.0155** 
RETPSR 0.043520 12.36052 0.0000*** 
R2 = 0.703643 
Adj R2 = 0.703525 
F = 5999.871(0.0000)*** 
DW = 1.788293; sample 159 firm - year; Heteroscedasticity test using Breusch Pagan 
Godfrey and showing insignificant probability at α > 0.05; Normality test using Jarque Bera, 
residual has a normal distribution. 
 * significant at p<0.1, ** significant at p<0.05, *** significant at p<0.01 
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Table 8. Negative UE Regression Test Result 
 itititit UEPDUESPUEUECAR *** 3210  itUEMB *4
 itititit UEBETAUECFOUELEVUELTA **** 8765  itUERET *9
itit eUeRETPASAR *10  
Variable Coefficient t p-value 
UE -0.063865 -23.28944 0.0000*** 
SP*UE 0.004581 5.499228 0.0000*** 
PD*UE 0.063560 21.63938 0.0000*** 
MB*UE -0.000938 -6.286367 0.0000*** 
LTA*UE 0.007719 16.84984 0.0000*** 
LEV*UE -0.017588 -24.78612 0.0000*** 
CFO*UE -2.68E-09 -2.194534 0.0000*** 
RET*UE -0.311628 -79.44221 0.0000*** 
BETA*UE 0.025520 62.17505 0.0000*** 
RETPSR*UE -0.048198 -32.93196 0.0000*** 
R2 = 0.218698 
Adj R2 = 0.218389 
F = 707.3448(0.0000)*** 
DW = 1.909436; sample 159 firm - year; Heteroscedasticity test using Breusch Pagan 
Godfrey and showing insignificant at α > 0.05; Normality test using Jarque Bera, residual has 
a normal distribution. 
* significant at p<0.1, ** significant at p<0.05, *** significant at p<0.01 
 
In a case of negative UE, negative earn-
ings coefficient will be responded by investor 
at α=0.0000. UE correlated negatively with 
investor’s response, which means that small 
earnings coefficient will be responded by in-
vestor, and investor wants to know why the 
coefficient is small. This might be influenced 
by global crisis that started to take place in 
2007. An increasing stock return of a firm also 
gain investor’s attention and correlated nega-
tively with earnings coefficients at α=0.0000. 
Subsequently, auditor industry specialization, 
prospector-defender firm, and firm’s size are 
also correlated positively with investor re-
sponse at α=0.0000. It means that a firm au-
dited by an auditor industry specialization, 
prospector firm and big firms will be re-
sponded by investor and investor will invest 
its fund on those firms. When UE is negative, 
leverage, firm’s growth, operational cash flow, 
return and market return correlated negatively 
with market response, which means that in-
vestor will give more attention to a high-lever-
aged firm, high growth, and return on a small 
UE condition. This research result is in accor-
dance with those of Easton and Zmijewski 
(1989) and Collins & Khotari (1989), which 
shows that market response on earnings is 
varied and depended on firm’s type and time. 
CONCLUSION  
This study examines the influence of 
prospector-defender type of firm and auditor 
industry specialization on earnings manage-
ment through real activity and earnings qual-
ity. Test result shows that auditor industry 
specialization cannot restrict earnings man-
agement because the sign is negative, which 
means that auditor industry specialization has 
a low discretionary that indicates an earnings 
management. The result also showed that 
auditor industry specialization influenced 
earnings response coefficient (ERC) and is 
responded by investor. Beside auditor industry 
specialization, and prospector-defender, other 
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factors responded by investor and gained mar-
ket reaction are leverage, firm’s growth, CFO, 
firm’s size, firm’s stock return, beta, and mar-
ket return. 
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